Economic development and rising prosperity around the world have generated improvements of standards of living unprecedented in human history. Nevertheless, there remain individuals and families living in poverty. What are the most effective ways to help them?

Since ancient times, people, whether pagans, Jews, Christians, or of other faiths, have undertaken the provide aid to society’s most vulnerable members. Through history, however, changing social and economic circumstances have changed the ways in which people have fulfilled their desires and duties to assist their fellow men. By the end of the 19th century, it was widely argued that only “social justice” administered by the modern welfare state could effectively meet the needs of the poor. Against this backdrop, however, classical liberal thinkers have sought to alternative framework for modern philanthropy rooted in comparative historical and institutional analysis.

This lecture will explore the changing institutional terrain of charity in Western culture and introduce the key questions that begin to shape a classical liberal “ethic of beneficence.” Using Adam Smith’s discussion of justice and beneficence in his Theory of Moral Sentiments as a starting place, we will explore the problems with the modern quest for "social justice" and introduce a preliminary framework for a robust "ethic of beneficence" that will improve our understanding and practice of philanthropy and social entrepreneurship in a free society.

**Required Reading:**

Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (selections attached)  
Richard Cornuelle, "De-Nationalizing Community"
I.I.1

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

I.I.2

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dullness of the conception.

I.I.3

That this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious observations, if it should not be thought sufficiently evident of itself. When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw
back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation. Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. The very force of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of. Men of the most robust make, observe that in looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own, which proceeds from the same reason; that organ being in the strongest man more delicate, than any other part of the body is in the weakest.

I.I.4

Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer.

I.I.5

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.

I.I.6

Upon some occasions sympathy may be seen to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion. A smiling face is, to
every body that sees it, a cheerful object; as a sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one.

I.I.7

This, however, does not hold universally, or with regard to every passion. There are some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them. The furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to exasperate us against himself than against his enemies. As we are unacquainted with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home to ourselves, nor conceive any thing like the passions which it excites. But we plainly see what is the situation of those with whom he is angry, and to what violence they may be exposed from so enraged an adversary. We readily, therefore, sympathize with their fear or resentment, and are immediately disposed to take part against the man from whom they appear to be in so much danger.

I.I.8

If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence upon us. The effects of grief and joy terminate in the person who feels those emotions, of which the expressions do not, like those of resentment, suggest to us the idea of any other person for whom we are concerned, and whose interests are opposite to his. The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it, but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it.

I.I.9

Even our sympathy with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect. General lamentations, which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible. The first question which we ask is, What has befallen you? Till this be answered, though we are uneasy both from the vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow-feeling is not very considerable.

I.I.10

Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it. We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality. We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we
cannot help feeling with what confusion we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.

I.I.11

Of all the calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind, the loss of reason appears, to those who have the least spark of humanity, by far the most dreadful, and they behold that last stage of human wretchedness with deeper commiseration than any other. But the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer. The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgment.

I.I.12

What are the pangs of a mother, when she hears the moanings of her infant that during the agony of disease cannot express what it feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she joins, to its real helplessness, her own consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown consequences of its disorder; and out of all these, forms, for her own sorrow, the most complete image of misery and distress. The infant, however, feels only the uneasiness of the present instant, which can never be great. With regard to the future, it is perfectly secure, and in its thoughtlessness and want of foresight, possesses an antidote against fear and anxiety, the great tormentors of the human breast, from which reason and philosophy will, in vain, attempt to defend it, when it grows up to a man.

I.I.13

We sympathize even with the dead, and overlooking what is of real importance in their situation, that awful futurity which awaits them, we are chiefly affected by those circumstances which strike our senses, but can have no influence upon their happiness. It is miserable, we think, to be deprived of the light of the sun; to be shut out from life and conversation; to be laid in the cold grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the earth; to be no more thought of in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and almost from the memory, of their dearest friends and relations. Surely, we imagine, we can never feel too much for those who have suffered so dreadful a calamity. The tribute of our fellow-feeling seems doubly due to them now, when they are in danger of being forgot by every body; and, by the vain honours which we pay to their memory, we endeavour, for our own misery, artificially to keep alive our melancholy remembrance of their misfortune. That our sympathy can afford them no consolation seems to be an addition to their calamity; and to think that all we can do is unavailing, and that, what alleviates all other distress, the regret, the love, and the laments of their friends, can yield no comfort to them, serves only to exasperate our sense of their misery. The happiness of the dead, however, most assuredly, is affected by none of these circumstances; nor
is it the thought of these things which can ever disturb the profound security of their repose. The idea of that dreary and endless melancholy, which the fancy naturally ascribes to their condition, arises altogether from our joining to the change which has been produced upon them, our own consciousness of that change, from our putting ourselves in their situation, and from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, makes us miserable while we are alive. And from thence arises one of the most important principles in human nature, the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society.

Section II  Of Justice and Beneficence
Chap. I  Comparison of those two virtues

II.II.1
Actions of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require reward, because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator.

II.II.2
Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment; because such alone are the approved objects of resentment, or excite the sympathetic resentment of the spectator.

II.II.3
Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may justly excite dislike and disapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any resentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recompense his benefactor when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his assistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. The heart of every impartial spectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the selfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest disapprobation. But still he does no positive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a passion which is naturally excited by impropriety of sentiment and behaviour; not of resentment, a passion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and positive hurt to some particular persons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial
spectator would approve of him for performing, would, if possible, be still more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would dishonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third person, who was not the superior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, those which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation. What friendship, what generosity, what charity, would prompt us to do with universal approbation, is still more free, and can still less be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generosity, nor even of friendship, when friendship is mere esteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices.

II.II.4

Resentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence. It prompts us to beat off the mischief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done; that the offender may be made to repent of his injustice, and that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. It must be reserved therefore for these purposes, nor can the spectator ever go along with it when it is exerted for any other. But the mere want of the beneficent virtues, though it may disappoint us of the good which might reasonably be expected, neither does, not attempts to do, any mischief from which we can have occasion to defend ourselves.

II.II.5

There is, however, another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment. This virtue is justice: the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives which are naturally disapproved of. It is, therefore, the proper object of resentment, and of punishment, which is the natural consequence of resentment. As mankind go along with, and approve of the violence employed to avenge the hurt which is done by injustice, so they much more go along with, and approve of, that which is employed to prevent and beat off the injury, and to restrain the offender from hurting his neighbours. The person himself who meditates an injustice is sensible of this, and feels that force may, with the utmost propriety, be made use of, both by the person whom he is about to injure, and by others, either to obstruct the execution of his crime, or to punish him when he has executed it. And upon this is founded that remarkable distinction between justice and all the other social virtues, which has of late been particularly insisted upon by an author of very great and original genius, that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity, or generosity; that the practice of these last mentioned virtues seems to be left in some measure to our own choice, but that, somehow or other, we feel ourselves to be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged to the observation of justice. We feel, that is to say, that force may, with the
utmost propriety, and with the approbation of all mankind, be made use of to
constrain us to observe the rules of the one, but not to follow the precepts of the
other.

II.II.6

We must always, however, carefully distinguish what is only blamable, or the
proper object of disapprobation, from what force may be employed either to punish or
to prevent. That seems blamable which falls short of that ordinary degree of proper
beneficence which experience teaches us to expect of every body; and on the
contrary, that seems praise-worthy which goes beyond it. The ordinary degree itself
seems neither blamable nor praise-worthy. A father, a son, a brother, who behaves to
the correspondent relation neither better nor worse than the greater part of men
commonly do, seems properly to deserve neither praise nor blame. He who surprises
us by extraordinary and unexpected, though still proper and suitable kindness, or on
the contrary by extraordinary and unexpected, as well as unsuitable unkindness,
seems praise-worthy in the one case, and blamable in the other.

II.II.7

Even the most ordinary degree of kindness or beneficence, however, cannot,
among equals, be extorted by force. Among equals each individual is naturally, and
antecedent to the institution of civil government, regarded as having a right both to
defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for those
which have been done to him. Every generous spectator not only approves of his
conduct when he does this, but enters so far into his sentiments as often to be willing
to assist him. When one man attacks, or robs, or attempts to murder another, all the
neighbours take the alarm, and think that they do right when they run, either to
revenge the person who has been injured, or to defend him who is in danger of being
so. But when a father fails in the ordinary degree of parental affection towards a son;
when a son seems to want that filial reverence which might be expected to his father;
when brothers are without the usual degree of brotherly affection; when a man shuts
his breast against compassion, and refuses to relieve the misery of his fellow
creatures, when he can with the greatest ease; in all these cases, though every body
blames the conduct, nobody imagines that those who might have reason, perhaps, to
expect more kindness, have any right to extort it by force. The sufferer can only
complain, and the spectator can intermeddle no other way than by advice and
persuasion. Upon all such occasions, for equals to use force against one another,
would be thought the highest degree of insolence and presumption.

II.II.8

A superior may, indeed, sometimes, with universal approbation, oblige those
under his jurisdiction to behave, in this respect, with a certain degree of propriety to
one another. The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children,
and children to maintain their parents, and impose upon men many other duties of
beneficence. The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of preserving
the public peace by restraining injustice, but of promoting the prosperity of the
commonwealth, by establishing good discipline, and by discouraging every sort of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not only prohibit mutual injuries among fellow-citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree. When the sovereign commands what is merely indifferent, and what, antecedent to his orders, might have been omitted without any blame, it becomes not only blamable but punishable to disobey him. When he commands, therefore, what, antecedent to any such order, could not have been omitted without the greatest blame, it surely becomes much more punishable to be wanting in obedience. Of all the duties of a law-giver, however, this, perhaps, is that which it requires the greatest delicacy and reserve to execute with propriety and judgment. To neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth to many gross disorders and shocking enormities, and to push it too far is destructive of all liberty, security, and justice.

II.II.9

Though the mere want of beneficence seems to merit no punishment from equals, the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the liveliest gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on the contrary, exposes to punishment, the observance of the rules of that virtue seems scarce to deserve any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfill all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.

II.II.10

As every man doth, so shall it be done to him, and retaliation seems to be the great law which is dictated to us by Nature. Beneficence and generosity we think due to the generous and beneficent. Those whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we think, be shut out, in the same manner, from the affections of all their fellow-creatures, and be allowed to live in the midst of society, as in a great desert where there is nobody to care for them, or to inquire after them. The violator of the laws of justice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done to another; and since no regard to the sufferings of his brethren is capable of restraining him, he ought to be over-awed by the fear of his own. The man who is barely innocent, who only observes the laws of justice with regard to others, and merely abstains from hurting his neighbours, can merit only that his neighbours in their turn should respect his innocence, and that the same laws should be religiously observed with regard to him.

Chap. II
II.II.11

Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit

There can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us. To disturb his happiness merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expense of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connexion, will give us less concern, will spoil our stomach, or break our rest much less than a very insignificant disaster which has befallen ourselves. But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect us much less than a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that small misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin. We must, here, as in all other cases, view ourselves not so much according to that light in which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant part of it. Though his own happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world besides, to every other person it is of no more consequence than that of any other man. Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to allow him to be more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his own happiness than that of any other person. Thus far, whenever they place themselves in his situation, they will readily go along with him. In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a
violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, sympathize with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and indignation. He is sensible that he becomes so, and feels that those sentiments are ready to burst out from all sides against him.

II.II.12

As the greater and more irreparable the evil that is done, the resentment of the sufferer runs naturally the higher; so does likewise the sympathetic indignation of the spectator, as well as the sense of guilt in the agent. Death is the greatest evil which one man can inflict upon another, and excites the highest degree of resentment in those who are immediately connected with the slain. Murder, therefore, is the most atrocious of all crimes which affect individuals only, in the sight both of mankind, and of the person who has committed it. To be deprived of that which we are possessed of, is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only the expectation. Breach of property, therefore, theft and robbery, which take from us what we are possessed of, are greater crimes than breach of contract, which only disappoints us of what we expected. The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others.

II.II.13

The violator of the more sacred laws of justice can never reflect on the sentiments which mankind must entertain with regard to him, without feeling all the agonies of shame, and horror, and consternation. When his passion is gratified, and he begins coolly to reflect on his past conduct, he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. They appear now as detestable to him as they did always to other people. By sympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must entertain for him, he becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence. The situation of the person, who suffered by his injustice, now calls upon his pity. He is grieved at the thought of it; regrets the unhappy effects of his own conduct, and feels at the same time that they have rendered him the proper object of the resentment and indignation of mankind, and of what is the natural consequence of resentment, vengeance and punishment. The thought of this perpetually haunts him, and fills him with terror and amazement. He dares no longer look society in the face, but imagines himself as it were rejected, and thrown out from the affections of all mankind. He cannot hope for the consolation of sympathy in this his greatest and most dreadful distress. The remembrance of his crimes has shut out all fellow-feeling with him from the hearts of his fellow-creatures. The sentiments which they entertain with regard to him, are the very thing which he is most afraid of. Every thing seems
hostile, and he would be glad to fly to some inhospitable desert, where he might never
more behold the face of a human creature, nor read in the countenance of mankind
the condemnation of his crimes. But solitude is still more dreadful than society. His
own thoughts can present him with nothing but what is black, unfortunate, and
disastrous, the melancholy forebodings of incomprehensible misery and ruin. The
horror of solitude drives him back into society, and he comes again into the presence
of mankind, astonished to appear before them, loaded with shame and distracted with
fear, in order to supplicate some little protection from the countenance of those very
judges, who he knows have already all unanimously condemned him. Such is the
nature of that sentiment, which is properly called remorse; of all the sentiments which
can enter the human breast the most dreadful. It is made up of shame from the sense
of the impropriety of past conduct; of grief for the effects of it; of pity for those who
suffer by it; and of the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the
justly provoked resentment of all rational creatures.

II.II.14

The opposite behaviour naturally inspires the opposite sentiment. The man who,
not from frivolous fancy, but from proper motives, has performed a generous action,
when he looks forward to those whom he has served, feels himself to be the natural
object of their love and gratitude, and, by sympathy with them, of the esteem and
approbation of all mankind. And when he looks backward to the motive from which he
acted, and surveys it in the light in which the indifferent spectator will survey it, he
still continues to enter into it, and applauds himself by sympathy with the approbation
of this supposed impartial judge. In both these points of view his own conduct appears
to him every way agreeable. His mind, at the thought of it, is filled with cheerfulness,
serenity, and composure. He is in friendship and harmony with all mankind, and looks
upon his fellow-creatures with confidence and benevolent satisfaction, secure that he
has rendered himself worthy of their most favourable regards. In the combination of
all these sentiments consists the consciousness of merit, or of deserved reward.

Chap. III

Of the utility of this constitution of Nature

II.II.15

It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to that
situation for which he was made. All the members of human society stand in need of
each others assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the
necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from
friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the different members
of it are bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it
were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good offices.

II.II.16

But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such generous
and disinterested motives, though among the different members of the society there
should be no mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved. Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation.

II.II.17

Society, however, cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another. The moment that injury begins, the moment that mutual resentment and animosity take place, all the bands of it are broke asunder, and the different members of which it consisted are, as it were, dissipated and scattered abroad by the violence and opposition of their discordant affections. If there is any society among robbers and murderers, they must at least, according to the trite observation, abstain from robbing and murdering one another. Beneficence, therefore, is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.

II.II.18

Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the pleasing consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and enforce the practice of it by the terrors of merited punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building, and which it was, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no means necessary to impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms. In order to enforce the observation of justice, therefore, Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to chastise the guilty. Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom they have no particular connexion, in comparison of what they feel for themselves; the misery of one, who is merely their fellow-creature, is of so little importance to them in comparison even of a small conveniency of their own; they have it so much in their power to hurt him, and may have so many temptations to do so, that if this principle did not stand up within them in his defence, and overawe them into a respect for his innocence, they would, like wild beasts, be at all times ready to fly upon him; and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of lions.

II.II.19

In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or
animal body, admire how every thing is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species. But in these, and in all such objects, we still distinguish the efficient from the final cause of their several motions and organizations. The digestion of the food, the circulation of the blood, and the secretion of the several juices which are drawn from it, are operations all of them necessary for the great purposes of animal life. Yet we never endeavour to account for them from those purposes as from their efficient causes, nor imagine that the blood circulates, or that the food digests of its own accord, and with a view or intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion. The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made, the pointing of the hour. All their various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better. Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watch-maker, and we know that they are put into motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as they do. But though, in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God. Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects which are ascribed to it; and the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a single principle.

II.II.20

As society cannot subsist unless the laws of justice are tolerably observed, as no social intercourse can take place among men who do not generally abstain from injuring one another; the consideration of this necessity, it has been thought, was the ground upon which we approved of the enforcement of the laws of justice by the punishment of those who violated them. Man, it has been said, has a natural love for society, and desires that the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake, and though he himself was to derive no benefit from it. The orderly and flourishing state of society is agreeable to him, and he takes delight in contemplating it. Its disorder and confusion, on the contrary, is the object of his aversion, and he is chagrined at whatever tends to produce it. He is sensible too that his own interest is connected with the prosperity of society, and that the happiness, perhaps the preservation of his existence, depends upon its preservation. Upon every account, therefore, he has an abhorrence at whatever can tend to destroy society, and is willing to make use of every means, which can hinder so hated and so dreadful an event. Injustice necessarily tends to destroy it. Every appearance of injustice, therefore,
alarms him, and he runs, if I may say so, to stop the progress of what, if allowed to go
on, would quickly put an end to every thing that is dear to him. If he cannot restrain it
by gentle and fair means, he must beat it down by force and violence, and at any rate
must put a stop to its further progress. Hence it is, they say, that he often approves of
the enforcement of the laws of justice even by the capital punishment of those who
violate them. The disturber of the public peace is hereby removed out of the world,
and others are terrified by his fate from imitating his example.

II.II.21

Such is the account commonly given of our approbation of the punishment of
injustice. And so far this account is undoubtedly true, that we frequently have
occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by
reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society. When the guilty is
about to suffer that just retaliation, which the natural indignation of mankind tells
them is due to his crimes; when the insolence of his injustice is broken and humbled
by the terror of his approaching punishment; when he ceases to be an object of fear,
with the generous and humane he begins to be an object of pity. The thought of what
he is about to suffer extinguishes their resentment for the sufferings of others to
which he has given occasion. They are disposed to pardon and forgive him, and to
save him from that punishment, which in all their cool hours they had considered as
the retribution due to such crimes. Here, therefore, they have occasion to call to their
assistance the consideration of the general interest of society. They counterbalance
the impulse of this weak and partial humanity by the dictates of a humanity that is
more generous and comprehensive. They reflect that mercy to the guilty is cruelty to
the innocent, and oppose to the emotions of compassion which they feel for a
particular person, a more enlarged compassion which they feel for mankind.

II.II.22

Sometimes too we have occasion to defend the propriety of observing the
general rules of justice by the consideration of their necessity to the support of
society. We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred
rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently
from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our
indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles.
But though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness, which originally
inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we
condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest
them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet why should it not;
if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred
and detestation? But when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a
manner, the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it, this manner of
acting does not appear to be for its own sake the natural and proper object of those
sentiments. We must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of
something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for other arguments, and
the consideration which first occurs to us, is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail, therefore, to insist upon this topic.

II.II.23

But though it commonly requires no great discernment to see the destructive tendency of all licentious practices to the welfare of society, it is seldom this consideration which first animates us against them. All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be.

II.II.24

That it is not a regard to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations. The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society. We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, because this man is a member or part of society, and because we should be concerned for the destruction of society, than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, because this guinea is a part of a thousand guineas, and because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. In neither case does our regard for the individuals arise from our regard for the multitude: but in both cases our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed. As when a small sum is unjustly taken from us, we do not so much prosecute the injury from a regard to the preservation of our whole fortune, as from a regard to that particular sum which we have lost; so when a single man is injured, or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured. It is to be observed, however, that this concern does not necessarily include in it any degree of those exquisite sentiments which are commonly called love, esteem, and affection, and by which we distinguish our particular friends and acquaintance. The concern which is requisite for this, is no more than the general fellow-feeling which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow-creature. We enter into the resentment even of an odious person, when he is injured by those to whom he has given no provocation. Our disapprobation of his ordinary character and conduct does not in this case altogether prevent our fellow-feeling with his natural indignation; though with those who are not either extremely candid, or who have not been accustomed to correct and regulate their natural sentiments by general rules, it is very apt to damp it.

II.II.25

Upon some occasions, indeed, we both punish and approve of punishment, merely from a view to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot
otherwise be secured. Of this kind are all the punishments inflicted for breaches of
what is called either civil police, or military discipline. Such crimes do not immediately
or directly hurt any particular person; but their remote consequences, it is supposed,
do produce, or might produce, either a considerable inconveniency, or a great disorder
in the society. A centinel, for example, who falls asleep upon his watch, suffers death
by the laws of war, because such carelessness might endanger the whole army. This
severity may, upon many occasions, appear necessary, and, for that reason, just and
proper. When the preservation of an individual is inconsistent with the safety of a
multitude, nothing can be more just than that the many should be preferred to the
one. Yet this punishment, how necessary soever, always appears to be excessively
severe. The natural atrocity of the crime seems to be so little, and the punishment so
great, that it is with great difficulty that our heart can reconcile itself to it. Though
such carelessness appears very blamable, yet the thought of this crime does not
naturally excite any such resentment, as would prompt us to take such dreadful
revenge. A man of humanity must recollect himself, must make an effort, and exert
his whole firmness and resolution, before he can bring himself either to inflict it, or to
go along with it when it is inflicted by others. It is not, however, in this manner, that
he looks upon the just punishment of an ungrateful murderer or parricide. His heart,
in this case, applauds with ardour, and even with transport, the just retaliation which
seems due to such detestable crimes, and which, if, by any accident, they should
happen to escape, he would be highly enraged and disappointed. The very different
sentiments with which the spectator views those different punishments, is a proof that
his approbation of the one is far from being founded upon the same principles with
that of the other. He looks upon the centinel as an unfortunate victim, who, indeed,
must, and ought to be, devoted to the safety of numbers, but whom still, in his heart,
he would be glad to save; and he is only sorry, that the interest of the many should
oppose it. But if the murderer should escape from punishment, it would excite his
highest indignation, and he would call upon God to avenge, in another world, that
crime which the injustice of mankind had neglected to chastise upon earth.

II.II.26

For it well deserves to be taken notice of, that we are so far from imagining that
injustice ought to be punished in this life, merely on account of the order of society,
which cannot otherwise be maintained, that Nature teaches us to hope, and religion,
we suppose, authorises us to expect, that it will be punished, even in a life to come.
Our sense of its ill desert pursues it, if I may say so, even beyond the grave, though
the example of its punishment there cannot serve to deter the rest of mankind, who
see it not, who know it not, from being guilty of the like practices here. The justice of
God, however, we think, still requires, that he should hereafter avenge the injuries of
the widow and the fatherless, who are here so often insulted with impunity. In every
religion, and in every superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there
has been a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just.